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 Analytic Modeling of Insurgencies 
 
Moshe Kress 




Legacy force-on-force models are symmetrical; they reflect the fact that the dynamics of both 
sides in the conflict is governed by similar rules. These models have also traditionally focused on 
the physical aspects of armed conflicts – fire, attrition, detection, movement, logistics, etc. 
Insurgency models are different in two key aspects: (a) they are asymmetrical and (b) they 
contain, in addition to the physical aspects, significant cognitive, social, cultural, political and 
economic factors. The reason for the asymmetry is the way insurgents evolve and operate, and 
the emergence of non-physical factors is due to the major role of civilians in such conflicts. This 
article focuses on analytic modeling of insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, 
describing both the physical and non-physical components of such armed conflicts.   




Combat modeling is one of the oldest areas of operations research, dating back to the 
Kriegsspiels—board war-games developed in the early 19th century for training, planning, and 
testing military operations in the Prussian Army. The ground-breaking work of Lanchester in 
1916 [1] marks the beginning of formal models of conflicts, where mathematical formulas and, 
later on, computer simulations replace board games and sand tables. From WWII until a decade 
ago combat models have mostly been focused on the physical aspect of conflicts. These models 
have been typically applied to regular force-on-force engagements, where adversary armies, 
navies and air-forces engage in, so called, “kinetic” actions that comprise fire, maneuver and 
attrition.  
Insurgencies are not new either; they date as far back as the Jewish revolt against the Seleucid 
Empire in the second century BC. Since then, insurgencies have been prevalent throughout 
history. While fighting the Japanese Imperial Army occupying China, Mao Tse-tung was one of 
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the first to offer a conceptual “model” of insurgencies in 1937 [2]. He described the insurgents as 
“fish” that must swim in the population’s “sea” to survive and prevail. More recent and formal 
models of insurgencies include Deitchman’s Guerrilla Warfare model [3], which is a Lanchester-
based mathematical model (see more details about this model later on), and McCormick’s Magic 
Diamond model [4], which is a conceptual model that identifies the players in an insurgency and 
specifies the interrelationships among them.  However, it is only since the early 2000s, following 
major insurgencies in Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East, that 
operations-oriented modeling of these armed conflicts has become prevalent. In particular, 
during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars operations-research analysts were deployed with combat 
units to collect and analyze data. They also utilized reach-back support from operations research 
analysts in the US for developing decision support models for both combat tactics against the 
insurgents and information operations aimed at gaining the support of the local population [5]. 
Insurgencies are different than regular force-on-force engagements. The two adversaries in an 
insurgency are government organized forces on one side, and, on the other side, loosely 
organized non-state actors, called henceforth insurgents, such as violent demonstrators, armed 
rebels and terrorists. While there are some differences between Counterinsurgency and 
counterterror operations – mostly in terms of scale of operations and countermeasures (see, e.g., 
[6]) – in some places in the following the two terms may be used interchangeably.  
In one-on-one situations, the non-state actors – the insurgents – are no match to the state-
controlled government forces, who are significantly larger, better equipped and better trained. To 
avoid eradication, the insurgents must reduce their signature as targets, and this elusiveness is 
attained by blending in with the civilian population among which the insurgents operate. The 
insurgents use relatively simple, yet lethal, weapons such as small arms, improvised explosive 
devices, and suicide bombs. 
The asymmetry described above is one significant characteristic of insurgencies. The second 
characteristic is the active role played by civilians who provide insurgents, either willingly or as 
a result of coercion, hiding places, shelters, logistical support, and most importantly – 
information and recruits. Civilians play other roles too: they may provide information 
(intelligence) to the government forces regarding insurgents’ activities and whereabouts, they 
consume social and economic resources that are provided either by the insurgents or the 
government, and they are possible targets to violent actions by both sides (see e.g., the conflict in 
Syria that started in 2011). All these characteristics make civilians a key component in 
insurgency modeling, which is absent in legacy armed-conflict models. In particular, models 
from behavioral science, sociology, political science and economics play a major role in 
insurgency modeling.  
There are several ways to model insurgencies. Probably the most popular models are detailed 
(e.g., agent-based) simulations that represent both physical and cognitive interrelations among 
stakeholders in such conflicts. Some examples of simulation models are mentioned later on. 
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Another possible modeling approach is system dynamics [7]. A “softer” side of insurgency 
analysis – by means of political science, sociology and behavioral science – is embodied in the 
works of Kilcullen [8], which has been influential in planning counterinsurgency operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Another important political and economic analysis of an insurgency is 
reported in [9]. 
In this article, however, we focus on OR analytic modeling based on formal methodologies such 
as differential equations, utility theory, game theory, and probability models. Besides their 
elegance, the conceptual simplicity of these models provides transparency, facilitates a clear 
description of cause-and-effect relations, and thus offers strategic insights regarding insurgency 
situations.  Because of these features, some of the models presented below have been briefed to 
top leadership in the US Army. 
Following a general discussion on analytic modeling of insurgencies presented in the next 
section, we describe three families of models addressing three major issues: (1) Eyes and Ears: 
the impact of information, intelligence and situational awareness on the conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations, (2) Hearts and Minds: the effect of civilians’ behavior and attitude 
towards the insurgents and the government, and (3) Bullets and Fire: the “kinetics” of 
insurgencies that represents the physical attrition in this type of conflicts. The three families are 
obviously related – e.g., informational models may have some attrition and behavioral 
components. Thus, the classification mentioned above – information, behavior and attrition – 
only serves for highlighting the main thrust of the models included in each corresponding 
section.  
2. The Big Picture 
The three major players in an insurgency are the two adversaries – the government forces and the 
insurgents – and the civilian population, which is caught in the middle. A fourth player is the 
international community [4], [10] who may (e.g., Libya, 2011) or may not (e.g., Syria, 2011-
2014) be actively involved in the conflict. Because international forces, if they get actively 
involved in the insurgency, typically side with either the government (e.g., Afghanistan) or the 




Figure 1: The Stakeholders in an Insurgency 
The government and the insurgents are engaged in an armed conflict (the “Combat” link in 
Figure 1) governed by violent actions and mutual attrition. The civilian population is divided into 
three groups: supporters of the government, supporters of the insurgents called henceforth 
contrarians and those who maintain neutrality. The government and the insurgents, while trying 
to gain the support of the population, provide social benefits such as healthcare and education, 
but they may also impose some requirements such as dress codes, taxes and draft. The insurgents 
also use aimed violence against civilians to coerce them to collaborate and deter them from 
supporting the government. These actions, combined with observations on the state of the armed-
conflict between the insurgents and the government forces, lead to shifts in civilians’ behavior 
regarding their support to the two sides. Contrarians support the insurgents by providing hiding 
places, recruits, logistics support and information, while government supporters mostly provide 
information, in the form of human intelligence (HUMINT), to government forces. 
As mentioned earlier, the blue block corresponding to Government Forces in Figure 1 may 
contain several stakeholders such as regular government army, police forces, and international 
forces supporting the government. The red block corresponding to the Insurgents may also 
comprise non-homogeneous forces in the form of a number of competing tribal or sectarian 
militias who may also fight each other to gain control of the insurgency (e.g., Syria 2013-2014). 
There were several attempts to develop analytic insights regarding the observed evolution of 
insurgencies. Bohorquez and others [11] examine the patterns of violence in insurgencies and 
terror events and identify a common pattern regarding the size distribution of such events and 
their timing. Their dynamic model explaining this pattern is based on the notion of coalescence 
and fragmentation of insurgents or terror organizations, thus producing ecology of groups. A 
















which is manifested in a power law, identifies possible escalation scenarios of such attacks. The 
authors establish a new metric for understanding the momentum of these attacks and the 
effectiveness of COIN actions—a metric that appears to be stable across multiple conflicts and at 
different scales. 
3. Eyes and Ears 
Situational awareness regarding the battlefield, generated by a steady, relevant and reliable 
stream of intelligence reports, is an important factor in any armed conflict. In order to effectively 
deploy and operate its weapons and other combat assets, a military force needs to know the 
deployment, capabilities, plans and intentions of its adversary, as well as details regarding the 
combat environment. Situational awareness becomes even more critical in counterinsurgency 
operations because of the two aforementioned characteristics: asymmetry and the significant 
active role of civilians.  First, the asymmetry is manifested in elusive, well hidden insurgents, 
diffused among civilians and thus reducing their signature as targets. This elusiveness requires 
extra effort by the government forces – mostly by acquiring intelligence from human sources – 
to locate and effectively engage the insurgents. Second, the impact of civilians on the evolution 
of an insurgency necessitates social, cultural and behavioral intelligence about the population’s 
attitude, mood and sentiments. This type of intelligence is typically absent in legacy force-on-
force conflicts (see also next section). 
3.1 Generalized Deitchman Model 
The first to capture the asymmetry feature in a Lanchesterian setting was Deitchman [3] in his 
Guerrilla Warfare model, which is a pair of differential equations. If ( )G t and ( )I t  are the sizes 
of the government forces and the insurgents at time t, respectively, and P is the size of the 
civilian population, then Deitchman’s model states that 
'( ) ( )
( )'( ) ( )
G t I t







where ,α γ are attrition coefficients and the signature of the insurgents – their proportion in the 
population – is represented by ( ) .I t
P
 The larger the population among which the insurgents are 
diffused, the smaller is the insurgents’ signature and thus the smaller the effectiveness of the 
government forces in fighting the insurgents. Deitchman’s model was extended in [13], [14] and 
[15]. Absent accurate situational awareness, that is, information regarding the whereabouts of the 
insurgency targets, not only might the guerrillas be able to continue their insurgency actions 
unhindered, but collateral damage caused to civilians from poor targeting by the government 
forces may generate an adverse response against the government, thus creating popular support 
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for the insurgents [16]. This popular support may translate into new cadres of recruits to the 
insurgency ranks [17]. This dynamics of two-sided attrition, collateral casualties among civilians, 
recruitment to the insurgency and reinforcement to the government forces, is captured by a pair 
of differential equations in [14]. The imperfect situational awareness, which results in collateral 
casualties, turns out to be crucial. Analyzing the differential-equations model results in some 
operational insights. While perfect targeting would eradicate the insurgents in no time, it is 
shown that, under reasonable assumptions, the government forces can never do that if the 
situational awareness is imperfect. The best the government forces can hope for is containing the 
insurgency at some manageable size, a result that has been confirmed empirically in recent 
insurgencies (e.g., Afghanistan, Syria). Moreover, it is shown that there may be two steady-state 
containment situations. One stalemate scenario involves relatively low level of violent activity 
by the government forces. However, this stalemate is fragile from the government point of view; 
small changes in the balance of forces could lead to quick government demise. The other steady-
state containment scenario involves high level of violent activity and is more stable. In any case, 
the only alternative, which is the worse-case scenario for the government, is when the latter 
actually loses, as was the case in Libya, Tunisia and Yemen in 2011 (aka “Arab Spring”). 
 
3.2 Searching for Insurgents 
 
Optimizing the search for hiding insurgents could be modeled as a whereabouts search problem 
[18]. The objective here is to detect, as fast as possible, an insurgents’ cell that is hidden in one 
out of n possible locations observed by an imperfect sensor. The cost of searching a location is c, 
and the intelligence obtained from this search may be false negative (the searcher failed to detect 
an insurgents’ cell) with probability 1 – p, false positive (the searcher erroneously identifies a 
location as an insurgents’ cell), with probability q. An indication by the sensor that a certain 
location is an insurgents’ cell, may be correct – insurgents are indeed hiding in that location – or 
wrong – the location is void of insurgents. Following such an indication (correct or wrong), a 
combat team is sent out with the objective to capture the insurgents in the indicated location. The 
operational costs of such actions are PC  and ,WC for correct and wrong scenarios, respectively. In 
case the indication is wrong, the cost may be collateral damage and lost of time and effort. It is 
shown in [19] that the optimal search sequence of the sensor follows a greedy policy that only 




 in the various locations. 
3.3 Balancing Between Intelligence Collection and Analysis 
Collecting, processing and analyzing intelligence for obtaining a current and reliable situational 
awareness is a complex task that requires considerable resources. In particular, it is crucially 
important to balance off between the collection effort – gathering information and data from an 
assortment of sources – and the analysis effort – analyzing the collected information and 
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producing useful operational knowledge. In a model that addresses this issue [20], using game-
theoretic arguments in a queuing setting, assuming two types of traffic – light and heavy, the 
authors identify equilibria under various operational scenarios. They conclude that, contrary to 
current practices in the counterterrorism intelligence community, more should be invested in 
analysis so as to reduce the size of the queue of intelligence input. 
4. Hearts and Minds 
First coined by the British in Malaya during the early 50’s of the last century, and later on used 
in Vietnam (60’s) and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, “winning hearts and minds” is an 
operational concept that aims at swaying public support towards one side in the conflict. Because 
public opinion plays a major role in shaping the way an insurgency evolves, both sides – the 
government and the insurgents – take actions to win the support of the people. Which actions are 
effective? How do these actions interact? What is the end-effect of these actions? These types of 
questions have been addressed mostly in simulations [21], such as agent-based simulations [22], 
[23]. Various empirical approaches for addressing these questions have been reported in the 
political science literature, e.g., [9], [24]. Modeling public behavior takes into account the 
difference between the attitude of an individual (his “heart”) and his behavior (his “mind”). For 
example, a person who fundamentally opposes the insurgents in his heart (attitude) may express 
latent or even active support to the insurgents in his mind (behavior) based on pragmatic 
considerations. The terms attitude and behavior used here are related, respectively, to the terms 
“private preference" and “public preference" used in [25]. While it may be hard to change the 
attitude of people – their fundamental beliefs and values that have been shaped over centuries of 
cultural evolution – it may be possible to affect their manifested behavior, which is influenced by 
interests and utilities.  
 
4.1 Carrots and Sticks  
 
An analytic model that captures the aforementioned utilitarian aspect is presented in [26]. The 
situation modeled therein is as follows: a certain region is under the control of the insurgents 
who act there quite freely. Civilians in that region react to these actions based on their perception 
regarding the capabilities and intentions of the government, had it been in control instead of the 
insurgents, to improve or worsen their welfare. The insurgents execute two types of actions: (a) 
violent actions, aimed to coerce potential supporters of the government, which are only targeted 
at such suspected civilians (y), and (b) non-violent supportive economic and social actions aimed 
at gaining the population support (x). The dilemma of the insurgents is how to balance these two 
types of actions – the “sticks” y and the “carrots” x. A dynamic utility-based model is developed 
in [26] in which the state variables are the fractions of contrarians (supporters of the insurgency) 
(C), latent supporters of the government (L) and active supporters of the government (A) in the 
population. The model is parameterized by the activity levels of the insurgents (x,y) for both non-
violent and violent actions, which are assumed to be bounded by the available resources to the 
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insurgents, as depicted in Figure 3. It is shown that the model converges into equilibrium, and 
the main insight is that tipping points may occur, where small changes in the aforementioned 
balance between insurgents’ violent (y) and non-violent (x) actions can drastically change the 




Figure 2: Cascading Effects of Insurgency’s Actions 
 
The government should be aware of potential tipping points that lead to the elimination of most 
active supporters and attempt to avoid situations that lead to them. 
 
4.2  Civilians’ Reaction to Violence 
   
How civilians remember and react to violent actions by both sides – the insurgents and 
the government – is modeled in [27]. Arguably, the exposure to violence affects the people’s 
sense of security and is a major factor in shaping their allegiance to one side or another. Ceteris 
Paribus, people will support the side that provides a better sense of security [17] [28]. A key 
question is how do people remember violence; is it the first exposure to violence that shapes their 
behavior or the last such encounter? The dynamic differential-equations model in [27] takes into 
account the violence intensity ratio of the government and the insurgents, the effectiveness of 
coercion by the insurgents, the targeting accuracy (see Section 3 above), and the way civilians 
remember and respond to violence. The main conclusions of the analysis are: (1) Excess violence 
and poor targeting accuracy may lead to situations where civilians’ support for a certain side will 
vanish; (2) The government should not be discouraged by an initial small level of popular 
support because there are situations where this would actually play to its advantage if the 
insurgents are very violent and have poor situational awareness; (3) The effect of the initial 




More benefits by insurgents more contrarians C less supporters A,
Change in coercion is negligible  larger per-capita coercion for As.
More coercion  higher cost for being 
supporter,  change in benefits negligible 
 Only a few change from C to A







of the insurgency depends on the way people remember and respond to violent experiences. For 
some responses the outcome is insensitive to this initial distribution. 
5. Bullets and Fire 
As observed by Deitchman [3] and others (see Section 3 above) counterinsurgency is essentially 
a contest of attrition that lends itself to classical combat modeling [29], [30].  
 
5.1 Confronting Entrenched Insurgents 
 
Similarly to [3], Kaplan et al. [31] use modified Lanchester models to study the force allocation 
problem of both the government and the insurgents and, using a sequential force allocation game 
between the two sides, obtain an equilibrium.  It is shown that the insurgents’ optimal strategy 
depends on the government level of situational awareness; when the government has perfect 
intelligence, in equilibrium the insurgents concentrate their force in a single stronghold that the 
government either attacks or leave unengaged, depending upon the resulting casualty count. 
Otherwise, under reasonable assumptions regarding the government’s behavior and intelligence 
capabilities, it is optimal for the insurgents to “spread out” in a way that maximizes the number 
of soldiers required to win all battles. This type of behavior was observed during the 2006 war 
against the Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the 2014 war against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. On the 
other hand, for a given allocation of insurgents across strongholds, it is shown that an optimal 
selection of insurgents’ strongholds to attack can be (approximately) accomplished with a simple 
knapsack rule that depends on the force size of the insurgents in a certain stronghold, the one-on-
one  fire-exchange relative strength, and the level of situational awareness.  
 
5.2 Controlling Territories 
Based also on a Lanchester setting, a model that accounts for the split between territorial regions 
loyal to the government and regions favoring the insurgents is described in [32]. Let B denote the 
government forces and R the insurgents. Also, the fraction of regions inhabited by government 
supporters is S and the fraction of insurgents’ supporters country is C, S +C =1 – see Figure 3. 
SB and CR indicate the fraction of regions that are liberated. That is, SB is the proportion of the S 
regions approvingly controlled by the government, and CR is the proportion of the C regions 
approvingly controlled by the insurgents. Similarly, SR and CB indicate subjugated regions – 
regions coercively controlled by the other side. Solid lines in Figure 3 indicate changes in control 
due to liberation, while dashed lines indicate subjugation. Regions do not change allegiances 
even under occupation, and each side can exert military force, to liberate or subjugate, only out 
of regions that support that side. It is shown that, contrary to classical Lanchesterian insights 
regarding traditional force-on-force engagements, the outcome of an insurgency is independent 
of the initial force sizes; it will only depend on the fraction of regions supporting each side and 
the combat effectiveness of each side. Moreover, unlike legacy force-on-force situations, 
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counterinsurgency allows for stalemates (see also Section 3 above). Very often it is hard to avoid 
stalemate without foreign support. The foreign support in Libya in 2011 led to a victory by the 
insurgents, while lack of such support in Syria has resulted in an on-going stalemate where some 
regions are controlled by the Assad forces and others are controlled by the insurgents. The 
model’s predictions have been consistent with the recently observed situations (2010-2014) in 








5.3 Tactical Issues 
 
A common threat in insurgencies is road-side attacks by improvised explosive devices [33]. A 
model addressing this problem is given in [34]. Based on collected data on attacks against 
coalition forces in Iraq, the paper presents a stochastic, game-theoretic, model for optimally 
allocating clearing devices by the Coalition forces on a network of roads. The insurgents are 
strategic; they observe the Coalition forces’ actions and they react to them. A related problem is 
the optimal interaction between a single military convoy of government forces and a single 
route-clearing team operating on a single roadway [35].  
 
Another common threat by insurgencies – mostly used as terrorizing and coercing means against 
civilians – is suicide bombing. A person acts as a live bomb, killing and harming other people 
while killing himself or herself. The physics of this type of attack is studied in [36], where the 
effect of crowd blocking emerges as a significant factor in estimating the number of casualties. 
Mitigation tactics for this type of attack are examined, using probability models, in [37]. It is 
shown that even under best-case assumptions regarding the effectiveness and timeliness of 
widespread deployment of detection sensors against potential attackers, the expected number of 
casualties will not be significantly reduced compared to no detection. Thus, suicide-bomber-






random pedestrian suicide-bomber attacks. The effort should be focused in prevention, rather 
than mitigation. In other words – invest in intelligence. 
 
Summary 
Insurgencies are different than regular armed conflicts in the way they are physically manifested 
and the role civilians play in them. These differences are reflected in mathematical models that 
attempt to study, analyze and understand this type of confrontations. From purely attritional 
focused models that characterize legacy force-on-force abstractions, insurgency models move to 
behavioral, social, political and economic domains. The main challenges in insurgency modeling 
lie in these domains and are mostly associated with data collection and interpretation. Insurgency 
modeling will experience a huge leap in application and relevance once effective and reliable 
data-collection methods will be in place for monitoring public mood, sentiments and behavior 
doing such armed conflicts. The advent and proliferation of observable social networks may give 
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